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1 Introduction
At the height of the euro area crisis in mid-2012, a profound economic divide was opening
up between member states, raising doubts about the very survival of the monetary union.
In the stressed economies with weaker fundamentals, elevated sovereign risk was weighing on
private credit markets and contributing to very tight financial conditions (see, for example,
Lane 2012, ECB 2012, and IMF 2013). Even though the period of acute financial stress
appears to have ended, borrowing costs remain elevated in the stressed economies, holding
back economic activity and compounding the fiscal challenges in these countries.
In this paper, we analyze the implications of sovereign risk for macroeconomic stability in a
currency union, using a stylized monetary model calibrated to the euro area. Our focus is on
instability caused by self-fulfilling expectations of an economic downturn, that is, situations
in which the equilibrium is not uniquely determined. As is well understood, such equilibrium
indeterminacy can arise if policy rates remain constant for an extended period of time, for
example, due to the zero lower bound (ZLB). In the following, we analyze the conditions
under which a sovereign debt crisis in one part of the currency union exacerbates this risk of
indeterminacy, making the entire union vulnerable to a belief-driven deflationary downturn.
Our theoretical framework is a two-country version of the New Keynesian model considered in
Corsetti et al. (2013). In the model, government debt is not risk-free, and sovereign risk premia
increase nonlinearly as the fiscal outlook of a country deteriorates. Heterogeneous households
engage in borrowing and lending through financial intermediaries as in Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2009). We assume that the prevailing private-sector credit spread rises with sovereign risk,
because strained public finances increase the cost of financial intermediation. The link between
sovereign risk and private spreads creates a “sovereign risk channel” for the transmission of
macroeconomic shocks. This channel may be unimportant during normal times, since the
central bank can adjust policy rates to contain effective borrowing costs. However, sovereign
risk becomes highly consequential when, as in the recent euro area experience, monetary
policy is expected to be constrained by the ZLB for an extended period.
We calibrate our analysis to the euro area, with specific reference to the monetary, fiscal, and
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financial conditions of mid-2012. On the one hand, mid-2012 marked the most recent climax
of the euro area crisis, when intense market stress brought to light the growing economic
divide between stressed and other economies. One critical dimension of that divide was
perceived sovereign risk, as underpinned by a level difference in government indebtedness. In
the stressed economies, government debt, including estimates of contingent liabilities related
to ailing financial sectors, exceeded 125 percent of GDP, considerably more than the about
90 percent of GDP in the rest of the euro area. On the other hand, mid-2012 marked
the establishment of two important institutional initiatives, namely, the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) and the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Although the
two initiatives serve distinct purposes, each has been interpreted as a way to overcome the
euro area crisis through a partial, perhaps, pooling of sovereign risk. Indeed, calculations
show that full use of the scope provided by ESM and OMT could hypothetically even erase
all the differences in government indebtedness between stressed and other economies. In
practice, use of the ESM has been limited to date, and the ECB has yet to make a single
bond purchase under its OMT framework. Still, the mere creation of the framework has
already had a significant stabilizing effect on financial markets, pointing to the strength of
the underlying pledge.
In our calibration, we compare the pre-pooling to a hypothetical post-pooling scenario, under
different assumptions for the cyclical stance of fiscal policy. At the pre-pooling levels of debt,
the equilibrium in our baseline model is uniquely determined if the high-debt countries (are
expected to) pursue a procyclical spending policy, and/or if the lower-debt countries pursue
a countercyclical policy. In fact, determinacy is most readily assured when, in a recession,
budget cuts in the stressed economies are matched by fiscal expansion in the rest of the union.
Intuitively, procyclical austerity in the high-debt countries counteracts the effect of a belief-
driven downturn on the government budget, thus averting the rise in sovereign and private-
sector risk premia that could validate an initial adverse shift in expectations. Meanwhile,
countercyclical expansion in the rest of the euro area addresses the negative demand effects
of government spending cuts in the stressed economies via crowding-in effects, which tend
to be high when policy rates are tied to the ZLB (see, for instance, Christiano et al. 2011
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and Woodford 2011). However, a large fiscal multiplier also explains why the equilibrium is
not uniquely determined when both parts of the monetary union pursue a policy of strong
procyclical austerity.
Since risk premia rise nonlinearly in the level of debt, pooling of sovereign risk induces a
fall in effective borrowing costs in the stressed economies that is only partially offset by
higher risk premia in the other countries. The result is a less severe sovereign risk channel,
which in principle relaxes the constraint that macroeconomic stability imposes on fiscal policy.
Nonetheless, we find that risk pooling does not make the economy immune to any fiscal stance:
in our baseline calibration with pooled debt and a common fiscal stance, equilibrium still is
not uniquely determined if fiscal policy at the union level remains too strongly procyclical.
Our analysis underscores the importance of monetary conditions for how fiscal policy affects
the economy—a point recently emphasized by research on the fiscal multiplier at the ZLB,
notably by Woodford (2011). We focus on the interaction of fiscal policies, sovereign risk,
and the ZLB constraint. In this context, we find that small changes in the horizon over which
policy rates are constrained by the ZLB can determine the switch from stability to instability,
unless governments in high-debt countries systematically enact sharp procyclical budget cuts
during recessions.
Several aspects of our analysis have been addressed from different perspectives in the related
literature. In particular, we note that the present paper is not meant to add to the theory
of sovereign default. Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), a number of authors, including
Arellano (2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012), have recently modeled default as a strategic
decision of a sovereign that balances the gains from foregone debt service against the costs of
exclusion from international credit markets and output losses. In equilibrium, this implies that
the probability of default increases in the level of debt. In order to maintain the tractability
of our model for business cycle analysis, we impose such a relationship without explicitly
modeling a strategic default decision. Specifically, we link the sovereign risk premium to the
expected path of public debt (or, alternatively, to future fiscal deficits).
In addressing self-fulfilling expectations as a source of macroeconomic instability, our focus
on local determinacy is distinct from equilibrium multiplicity of the kind analyzed by Calvo
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(1988) and Cole and Kehoe (2000). This also implies that our analysis does not capture all
aspects of the crisis-response measures recently taken in the euro area. The ECB’s OMT, in
particular, can be interpreted as providing a monetary backstop that rules out self-fulfilling
market shutdowns via a credible, off-equilibrium strategy of bond purchases, as discussed by
Corsetti and Dedola (2013); see also Aguiar et al. (2012). By contrast, we focus here on
the combined impact of ESM and OMT on the pooling of government debt—a prominent
dimension of many proposals to resolve the euro area crisis.
Regarding the effects of sovereign risk on economic activity, we choose a New Keynesian
model in which, due to nominal rigidities, rising risk premia may directly weigh on aggregate
demand and hence output. Other transmission channels have been proposed elsewhere. In
Mendoza and Yue (2012), for instance, output losses are linked to firms that rely on external
finance to import highly productive inputs from abroad. Financial disruptions around a
default event raise the effective costs of these inputs, causing firms to replace them with less
productive domestic substitutes. Acharya et al. (2013) focus on the loop between sovereign
risk and bank credit risk. In their model, a bailout of financial intermediaries weighs on the
budget and thus raises the probability of sovereign default. This in turn reduces collateral
values and exacerbates debt overhang problems in the private sector, hampering investment.
Notwithstanding these potentially important additional channels of transmission, our own
analysis suggests that, at the ZLB, standard aggregate demand channels can play a critical
role in propagating and amplifying the disruptive effects of fiscal stress.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical observations that
inform and motivate our subsequent model-based analysis. In particular, we provide evidence
for the sovereign risk channel, document recent changes in the fiscal stance of the euro area,
and estimate the maximum scope for effective debt pooling under the current institutional
arrangements. Section 3 presents our formal model. Section 4 provides a detailed account
of the transmission mechanism under a sovereign risk channel, deriving analytical results
based on a simplified version of the model. Section 5 presents our main results, based on a
full-fledged numerical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Financial conditions and policy measures in the euro area
The euro area has witnessed four macroeconomic developments in recent years that are di-
rectly relevant to the analysis of this paper: a rise in sovereign risk premia, a related increase
in private-sector risk premia, an unusually constrained central bank, and a shift toward area-
wide fiscal austerity. As will become clear in our model-based analysis below, these develop-
ments taken together pose a considerable threat to macroeconomic stability. In this section,
we briefly document each of the four developments in turn.
Throughout, we divide the member states of the euro area into two groups: the “stressed”
economies, which include Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain, and
the rest, which includes the other ten euro area member states.1 The two groups account for
one third and two thirds of euro area output, respectively.
2.1 Evidence on the sovereign risk channel
This section documents the first two of the developments mentioned above: the rise in
sovereign spreads and their apparent spillover to private-sector borrowing conditions. Toward
this end, Figure 1 displays time series on credit default swap (CDS) spreads for government
debt (dashed red line) and nonfinancial corporate debt (solid blue line). The right panel refers
to the stressed economies, the left panel to the rest of the euro area.
From 2010 through mid-2012, sovereign CDS spreads rose markedly in the stressed economies,
but fairly little elsewhere. The same divergence is also apparent for the funding conditions
of nonfinancial corporate borrowers from the respective regions.2 As financial stress started
to abate in the second half of 2012, sovereign spreads in the stressed economies fell and so
again did the credit spreads in the nonfinancial corporate sector. Figure 1, thus, points to a
systematic relationship between the two series that is consistent with strong spillovers from
sovereign distress to private-sector financial conditions. Specifically, fears about potential
sovereign default—whether within the euro area or following a disorderly exit, which was
1Our approach closely follows the delineation between “core” and “periphery” in other publications, such
as IMF (2013, p. 6). One formal way of defining the two groups is based on the criterion of a sovereign CDS
spread below/above 150 basis points.
2For the entire time period shown, the daily correlation between sovereign and corporate CDS spreads in
the stressed economies is 0.83. For the other countries, it is lower, but still positive at 0.34.
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Figure 1: Sovereign and nonfinancial corporate CDS spreads
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Notes: 5-year CDS spreads in the euro area stressed economies vs. the rest of the euro area. The figure shows
spreads for sovereigns (dashed) and for nonfinancial corporations headquartered in the respective country group
(solid). Corporate data for the stressed economies include observations for Italy (number of firms in the sample:
4), Portugal (2), and Spain (6). The sample of other economies includes Austria (1), Finland (4), France (29),
Germany (21), and the Netherlands (8). The same relative weights are adopted for the sovereign and corporate
index series. For example, of the 63 firms in the ‘rest of the euro area’ sample, 29 are headquartered in France.
As a result, in the sovereign series for this sample, France has a weight of 29/63. The corporations in our
sample are the constituents of the Markit iTraxx Europe index. Data source: Bloomberg.
widely considered as a tail risk in early 2012—can cause a general retrenchment of private
credit, as potential lenders worry about broad-based economic disruption.3 This “sovereign
risk channel” will be a key ingredient of the model we present below.
A large body of literature supports the notion of a sovereign risk channel. Neri (2013), for
example, estimates that, between April 2010 and the end of 2011, sovereign spreads in the
crisis countries led to an increase in borrowing costs for nonfinancial firms and households by
130 and 60 basis points, respectively. For Italy (the largest of the stressed economies), Zoli
(2013) finds that some 50-60 percent of the increase in sovereign spreads is transmitted to
firms’ borrowing rates within six months; see also Albertazzi et al. (2012), Neri and Ropele
(2013), and the literature reviews in Cavallo and Valenzuela (2007) or Harjes (2011).4
3Figure 1 is likely to understate the extent of such spillovers, as the corporate sample under consideration
includes only the largest firms with usually good access to capital markets and often significant foreign opera-
tions. As the recent experience in the euro area confirms, smaller companies tend to face much tighter funding
conditions during times of domestic financial stress, especially when such stress affects the banking system, on
which they typically rely for credit.
4Our focus on spillovers from sovereigns to nonfinancial corporates is not meant to suggest that the rela-
tionship is unidirectional. Clearly, government support to the financial sector (as analyzed in Kollmann et al.
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Figure 2: Real primary government expenditure
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diture; index = 100 in the year before the global recession. Dashed lines denote IMF projections. Aggregates
are purchasing-power-parity weighted. Stressed economies include Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Rest of the euro area includes France and Germany. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook April 2013, Figure
1.1.2.
2.2 Fiscal and monetary policy
Our model will emphasize that in the presence of the sovereign risk channel, macroeconomic
stability is even more dependent than usual on the specifics of fiscal and monetary policy
interaction. In order to put our results into an appropriate context, we now provide a brief
characterization of fiscal and monetary policy since the beginning of the crisis.
2.2.1 A shift toward procyclical fiscal policy
As regards fiscal policy, most euro area governments ran sizable budget deficits during the
early stages of the global financial crisis. By 2010, however, with government debt and
sovereign risk premia on the rise, both the stressed and the other economies shifted to a
procyclical fiscal stance characterized by substantial real spending cuts in the midst of an
(area-wide) downturn. Figure 2 illustrates the unusual nature of this shift toward fiscal
(2012), among others) or broader weakness among corporates may jeopardize the health of public finances; see
also Acharya et al. (2013). In fact, our model includes a feedback channel through which a weakened corporate
sector further compounds the sovereign’s fiscal challenges. However, our primary interest is in the extent to
which sovereign weakness itself can induce macroeconomic instability—a constellation that strikes us as highly
relevant to the recent experience of economies like Italy.
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austerity. It compares the evolution of real primary government expenditure before and after
the global recession of 2009, with the developments in the previous three global recessions.5
The figure makes it clear that fiscal policy in the euro area since 2010 has been much tighter
than usual at this stage of the cycle. Furthermore, the tight stance is expected to persist,
particularly in the stressed economies.
Figure 3: Eonia and Eonia OIS-based forward curve (as of July 31, 2012)
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solid line shows monthly averages of Eonia rates from January 2007 through
May 2013. Dots mark Eonia OIS-based forward rates as of July 31, 2012.
A dashed vertical line marks this cutoff date. All entries are in percent.
2.2.2 Interest rates at the zero lower bound
The last building block in this paper is the central bank’s monetary stance. In reaction to the
crisis, the ECB has cut its policy rates to record-low levels, driving overnight money market
rates down to basically zero. Thus, Figure 3 shows that by mid-2012 the ECB had largely
exhausted its capacity to provide accommodation through conventional monetary policy. The
figure depicts the evolution of the overnight rate (Eonia, monthly averages) through May 2013
as a solid line, along with market-based expectations of future Eonia rates as of the end of
5The presentation follows IMF, World Economic Outlook April 2013. The concept of total primary expen-
diture considered there is broader than the notion of exhaustive government spending featured in our model
below. However, the qualitative behavior of the two series during the 2009 recession was similar, as government
cuts were typically broad-based.
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July 2012 as a dotted line. The cutoff at the end of July 2012 is chosen on purpose: it
coincides with the announcement of additional nonstandard monetary policy measures, the
details of which are discussed in Section 2.3 below.
The figure is consistent with the finding in Corsetti et al. (2013) that episodes of ultra-low
interest rates may last for a significant time in the presence of elevated sovereign risk. Indeed,
the imputed Eonia forward rates shown in Figure 3 suggest that market participants expected
overnight rates to be at, or very close to zero, for at least another eight to ten quarters.6
2.3 Nonstandard measures: Toward a partial pooling of sovereign risk
The euro area remains characterized by disagreement on the appropriate degree of fiscal
risk-sharing within the union. Notwithstanding this disagreement, measures taken since the
beginning of the crisis have created scope for some pooling of debt, as will be argued in
detail below. Abstracting from (obviously important) incentive effects and distributional
concerns, the rationale for such pooling is straightforward. Fiscal stress in one region can
jeopardize the stability of the union as a whole. To the extent that the risk of fiscal stress
rises disproportionately with the debt level, the pooling of liabilities across the union can
reduce the union-wide level of fiscal stress.
In the following, we focus on two policy innovations that can be interpreted in this light,
namely, the ESM and the ECB’s OMT. Both had been announced or at least foreshadowed
by the end of July 2012 and were formally established later that year. The right panel of
Figure 1 marks the OMT-related events, which appear particularly important. Specifically,
the first vertical line refers to ECB President Draghi’s announcement on July 26, 2012 “to do
whatever it takes to preserve the euro,” which foreshadowed a new bond purchase program.
The second vertical line marks the formal announcement of the OMT in September 2012.
The ESM, in turn, was inaugurated on October 8, 2012, following an extensive ratification
process. These developments in mid-2012, and especially the ECB’s communication regarding
OMT, prompted a sharp and persistent fall in risk premia across the stressed economies in
the euro area, albeit not fully back to pre-crisis levels. We therefore discuss in detail the scope
6Empirically, Eonia forwards tend to reflect the expected path of future rates with some upward bias,
especially at longer horizons. This is due to the presence of positive term premia.
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and implications for fiscal risk-sharing of both the ESM and the OMT. In Section 5 below,
we will analyze to what extent such risk-sharing may indeed be supportive of macroeconomic
stability.
The ESM allows sovereigns facing market pressures to obtain, under certain conditions, a
loan that is backed by the credit of other euro area members. As such, the ESM can be
interpreted as a partial transfer of creditworthiness from stronger to weaker economies. The
scale of this risk transfer depends on the actual utilization of the ESM, which has remained
limited to date. It seems plausible, however, to assume that the possibility of tapping the
ESM may provide a considerable benefit to countries struggling with elevated risk premia.
Accordingly, we treat the ESM’s maximum lending capacity as one aspect of tentative risk
pooling in the euro area. The ESM’s debt is backed by capital contributions from euro area
member states according to their shares in the capital of the ECB. Although the upfront
commitment of capital was limited to EUR 80 billion, the ESM’s maximum potential lending
capacity amounts to a much larger EUR 500 billion. Adding the capacity of the euro area’s
earlier (temporary) rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the total
reaches EUR 700 billion (see ESM, 2013). This latter sum amounts to about 7 percent of
euro area GDP, or 22 percent of the stressed economies’ GDP.
The ECB’s OMT framework, in turn, serves the stated purpose of restoring a uniform trans-
mission mechanism for the common monetary policy. While this mimics the objective of an
earlier ECB bond purchase program (the Securities Markets Program, or SMP), the OMT
scheme was designed to have a more powerful impact.7 It foresees potentially open-ended
ECB purchases of government paper with a remaining maturity of 1 to 3 years, meaning
that purchases are limited only by the amount of debt outstanding in that maturity bracket.
Table 1 summarizes the relevant data as of early 2013, treating all debt maturities in 2014
and 2015 as falling within the relevant maturity interval. Although no actual purchases have
been made to date, the scope for OMT is evidently large. Based on the debt figures shown
in Table 1, potential bond purchases for stressed economies alone exceed EUR 640 billion or
7Under the SMP, which was launched in May 2010 and closed in September 2012, the eurosystem bought
some EUR 220 billion (equivalent to about 2 percent of euro area GDP) in government bonds issued by Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
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20 percent of the formers’ GDP. The ECB has clarified that claims acquired through OMT
will rank pari passu with other creditor claims. The OMT program thus inevitably involves a
transfer of fiscal risks.8 In what follows, we specifically focus on this dimension, interpreting
the OMT program in terms of its potential contribution to the pooling of government debt in
the euro area. We already note, however, that this interpretation does not capture all aspects
of the OMT program, notably its nature as a monetary backstop as analyzed in detail by
Corsetti and Dedola (2013).
To quantify the extent of potential sovereign risk transfers through ESM and OMT, wherever
possible, we take the vantage point of mid-2012, that is, before either the ESM or the OMT
program had become operational. For debt and GDP data we draw on the IMF’s WEO
database of April 2012.9 At that point, the IMF projected the debt levels (the stock of general
government debt outstanding) for end-2012 at 109.0 and 80.5 percent of GDP, respectively, in
the stressed economies and the rest of the euro area. In addition to these explicit liabilities,
we include contingent liabilities related to potential support for the domestic financial sector,
based on the estimates by Arslanalp and Liao (2012). These contingent liabilities add another
17 and 12 percentage points of GDP to the liabilities of the stressed and other economies,
respectively.
In computing how the ESM and OMT could potentially affect the liabilities in the two parts
of the union, we assume that both the stressed and the other economies become liable for a
fraction of the total relevant exposure, corresponding to their share in the ECB’s capital (37
and 63 percent for the stressed and other economies, respectively).
To determine the hypothetical maximum scope for sovereign risk pooling, we assume that the
ESM and the ECB will only acquire exposures to the stressed economies of the euro area.
Regarding the ESM, this implies potential exposures for the other countries of some EUR 440
billion (63 percent of the total EFSF/ESM lending envelope of EUR 700 billion), or 7 percent
8Proponents of the program view this transfer of risks as central for resolving the euro area crisis. Critics
disagree on the costs and benefits of such a policy but tend to agree with the basic notion that ECB purchases
of government bonds constitute a partial pooling of sovereign risk. In order to address concerns about moral
hazard, the ECBs readiness to conduct OMT is subject to conditionality as established under EFSF/ESM-
sponsored adjustment programs.
9In Table 1 we consider data for debt as of February 2013, as historical data were not available to us.
Changes relative to mid-2012 should be small in any case.
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Table 1: Debt maturing in 2014 and 2015
Billions of euro Percent of total debt Percent of 2012 GDP
Rest of the euro area
France 253.1 18.6 12.2
Germany 243.0 21.8 9.2
Belgium 60.1 17.7 15.9
Netherlands 80.2 25.4 13.2
Austria 39.6 19.4 12.7
Finland 14.6 17.2 7.5
Slovak Republic 8.0 23.0 11.2
Luxembourg - 0.0 -
Malta 0.7 17.4 11.2
Estonia 0.0 3.5 0.0
Total 699.4 20.2 11.0
Stressed economies
Italy 369.2 22.6 23.5
Spain 199.9 27.0 18.8
Greece 22.8 7.9 11.0
Portugal 35.1 19.1 20.9
Ireland 11.4 7.9 7.2
Slovenia 2.9 16.8 8.1
Cyprus 2.4 24.4 13.0
Total 643.6 21.3 20.0
Source: Bloomberg as of Feb. 4, 2013, and IMF WEO (April 2012). Debt maturities
as reported in Bloomberg, while GDP data are taken from the IMF. Note that the sum
of all debt maturities reported by Bloomberg tends to be lower than the IMF’s estimates
of government debt outstanding (used below). There are several potential explanations,
including (i) the focus in Bloomberg on debt securities, which implies incomplete coverage
of bank loans extended to the government; (ii) broader coverage of the government sector in
the IMF’s data; and (iii) different accounting treatment. None of these differences, however,
matter for the purposes of determining the maximum amount of OMT purchases.
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Table 2: Government debt under different pooling assumptions (percent of GDP)
assuming full debt transfer after pooling
no pooling ESM only OMT only ESM and OMT
Rest of the euro area 92.5 99.4 98.8 105.8
Stressed economies 126.0 112.4 113.4 99.9
Notes: Figures refer to end-2012 and are expressed in percent of GDP. “Before pooling”
refers to general government debt as projected in the IMF’s April 2012 WEO, plus contingent
liabilities related to financial sector support as estimated by Arslanalp and Liao (2012).
of the group’s GDP. The amount of stressed economies’ debt eligible for OMT, in turn, is
about EUR 640 billion (see Table 1). Under the above assumptions, a full-blown program of
OMT bond purchases could raise the exposure of the rest of the euro area by about EUR 400
billion (63 percent of the total exposure), or 6.3 percent of its GDP. In the highly unlikely
event of a full write-down on all these exposures, the liabilities of the stressed economies
would fall accordingly, namely, by 13.6 percent of GDP for the ESM and 12.5 percent of GDP
under OMT, respectively.
Table 2 summarizes the implied maximum scope for the pooling and transfer of government
debt between the stressed and the other economies. It bears repeating that a fiscal transfer
of the extent shown in the table remains extremely unlikely under the current institutional
setup. Yet, it is striking to see that, under the assumptions above, the government liabilities
of the rest of the euro are could increase to the point of slightly exceeding those of the stressed
economies. In our model-based analysis below, we will formally evaluate the importance of the
inherent risk-sharing, by considering an illustrative ‘debt pooling’ scenario. In that scenario,
we assume for simplicity that risk-sharing effectively equalizes the indebtedness (in relation
to GDP) of sovereigns in the two parts of the union. The above calculations serve to show
that this is actually within the potential scope of the programs that have been put in place
in the euro area.
3 The model
Our model economy describes a monetary union that is comprised of two countries: Home
and Foreign. The countries differ in terms of size and fiscal policy settings, but otherwise
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are symmetric. Consumers in Home and Foreign have the same preferences for bundles of
differentiated goods. These goods are produced by firms in Home and Foreign, using Home
and Foreign labor, respectively. Prices of individual goods are sticky, so that output is
demand-determined.
As in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009, “CW” henceforth), we generate a need for financial inter-
mediation by assuming that households can be either borrowers (that is, have a preference
for early consumption) or savers. To keep the model analytically tractable, we posit that in-
termediaries operate in a competitive market at the union-wide level. They fund themselves
through deposits that pay the same return everywhere, regardless of the saver’s country of
residence. By contrast, the market for loans is subject to country risk. In particular, the fi-
nancial intermediaries’ costs of lending to the resident of a particular member state rise with
the costs of funding for the member state’s sovereign. Thus, an increase in sovereign risk ad-
versely affects private-sector borrowing conditions and depresses economic activity.10 These
spillovers are at the heart of the “sovereign risk channel.” Again for tractability, we make an-
other assumption that reduces the heterogeneity across households. Specifically, households
of a particular type and country of residence are assumed to join large families which pool
the assets of their constituents. Finally, since macroeconomic dynamics generate fluctuations
in the current account, we also make assumptions that ensure the stationarity of net foreign
assets. In particular, we assume that in each period a fixed share of households in Home and
Foreign are randomly selected to redraw not only their type (as in CW) but also their country
of residence.11
As regards notation, where applicable, and unless noted otherwise, Home and Foreign vari-
ables are expressed per capita of the Home and Foreign population, respectively. Foreign-
country variables are indexed by an asterisk.
10This assumption is motivated by the empirical observation that, as sovereign default looms, domestic
firms tend to face greater financial difficulties due to the risk of tax hikes, disruptive strikes, social unrest, and
general economic turmoil, all of which may raise the challenge of monitoring and enforcing loan contracts.
11All households that are about to change type first pool their assets within their previous family. With
their share of these assets, they then join a family that corresponds to their newly-drawn type and country
of residence. Clearly, these modeling assumptions imply that there is some limited cross-country risk sharing,
irrespective of government action. As far as the cross-country dimension is concerned, our approach comple-
ments the strategies to “close” open economy models discussed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003), with a
strategy adapted to models including borrowers and lenders following CW.
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3.1 Households
We assume that individual households differ in their preferences so that there is a role for
financial intermediation within countries. Households are indexed by their type and their
country of residence. Following CW, households can be borrowers (indexed by superscript
b) or savers (indexed by s). Savers can put their savings into domestic government bonds
or make one-period risk-free deposits with a union-wide financial intermediary. Borrowers
obtain funds from financial intermediaries. Their borrowing rates are subject to country-
specific spreads.
Extending the mechanics of the CW model to a two-country framework, we assume that
individual households’ location changes stochastically over time. At each point in time, a
fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of the population resides in Home, and the remaining 1 − θ households
reside in Foreign. In each period, a share (1 − δ), δ ∈ (0, 1), of household members change
their type. Upon doing so, the type changers receive a transfer that depends on their past
type. The transfers ensure that in equilibrium all type changers have the same wealth and
thus the same ex-ante marginal utility. After the transfers have taken place, the type changers
redraw their location and types. Type changers are assigned a country of residence as follows.
θ is the probability of being assigned to Home. 1 − θ is the probability of being assigned to
Foreign. Conditional on having been assigned to a country of residence, with probability
pib the type changer ends up with a borrower’s preferences. With the opposite probability
pis = 1− pib, the household ends up being a saver.
We assume that there is complete pooling of assets within households of a particular location
and type (“family”).12 Note that the assumed type-changing mechanism partially insures
households across types, by making changes in wealth levels temporary. Nevertheless, financial
conditions will differ in the short and medium run, thus affecting the consumption and labor
supply decisions of the different types of households.
Let τ ∈ {(H, b), (H, s), (F, b), (F, s)} capture the two characteristics of a household. As house-
12With positive government debt, assets of type changers will be positive on average. Therefore, if household
members lived, saved, and borrowed on their own, newly-minted “b”-types would have positive assets and,
therefore, would not borrow immediately. For this reason, we cannot aggregate borrowers and savers with
different histories the way that Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009) do.
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holds supply labor only in the country where they reside, the utility of an individual household
member is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [uτ (c
τ
t , h
τ
t )] ,
where β ∈ (0, 1). Note that expectations are formed both about aggregate shocks and the
future type. hτt denotes hours worked by the household. Throughout, we will assume that
uτ (c
τ
t , h
τ
t ) = ξ
τ c
τ
t
1−1/στ
1−1/στ − ψ
τ h
1+ν
t
1+ν , where ξ
τ , στ , ψτ , and ν are positive parameters.
The composite good cτt is a bundle of, respectively, the Home-produced and Foreign-produced
differentiated goods that a household of type τ consumes. Specifically, for each household τ
the consumption index is given by
ct =
cθH,tc
1−θ
F,t
θθ(1− θ)1−θ
.
Here cH,t and cF,t are bundles of Home- and Foreign-produced intermediate goods, bundled
according to the CES technology
cH,t =
[(
1
θ
) 1
µ
∫ θ
0
cH,t(j)
µ−1
µ dj
] µ
µ−1
, cF,t =
[(
1
1− θ
) 1
µ
∫ 1
θ
cF,t(j)
µ−1
µ dj
] µ
µ−1
, (1)
where cH,t(j) and cF,t(j) denote differentiated goods produced by firm j ∈ [0, 1] in Home and
Foreign, respectively. µ > 1 denotes the price elasticity of demand for differentiated output
goods. PH,t(j) and PF,t(j) are the prices denoted in the common currency of Home good
j and Foreign good j, respectively. We assume that the law of one price applies, so that
consumers in Home and Foreign pay the same price for the same good.13 The price indices
for Home and Foreign good bundles are defined as PH,t =
(
(1/θ)
∫ θ
0 PH,t(j)
1−µdj
) 1
1−µ
and
PF,t =
(
1/(1 − θ)
∫ 1
θ PF,t(j)
1−µdj
) 1
1−µ
. The consumer price index is given by
Pt = P
θ
H,tP
1−θ
F,t . (2)
13Note that a good is defined by both its country of production and its index j. In particular, good j produced
in Home and good j produced in Foreign are different goods. They can, therefore, command different prices.
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The terms of trade are defined as the relative price of Home goods to Foreign goods
τ t = PH,t/PF,t. (3)
Saving and borrowing is intermediated by perfectly competitive union-wide financial inter-
mediaries. Throughout the paper, we assume that these intermediaries do not default. At
the beginning of the period, and before type changes have played out, the combined wealth
(denoted in nominal terms and per capita of the domestic population) of Home households
who are savers is given by
As−t = S
p
t−1(1 + i
d
t−1) + (1− ϑt)B
g
t−1(1 + i
g
t−1) + T
c
t . (4)
Spt−1 denotes Home households’ deposits at financial intermediaries at the end of the previous
period. The deposits earn the deposit rate idt−1. Savers may also hold their domestic govern-
ment’s debt Bgt−1 ≥ 0. We depart from CW by assuming that, for the individual household,
government debt is not risk-free: In any given period, the government may honor its debt
obligations, in which case ϑt = 0; or it may partially default, in which case ϑt = ϑdef, with
ϑdef ∈ (0, 1) indicating the size of the haircut. i
g
t−1 is the notional interest rate on government
debt.
The risk of default affects the portfolio decisions of savers, and thus the wedge between the
risk-free rate, idt , and the interest rate on government debt, i
g
t . This interest rate wedge, as
discussed below, plays a crucial role, affecting the allocation even prior to an actual sovereign
default. To focus on the sovereign risk channel, we abstract from the possible ex-post con-
sequences of an actual default through appropriate assumptions. Specifically, we assume
transfers T ct that, in case of a sovereign default, compensate savers for the losses associated
with the default (see Schabert and van Wijnbergen (2008) for a similar setup). These trans-
fers do not affect investment decisions, as they are not proportional to the bond holdings of
an individual saver. Formally, we set
T ct = ϑtB
g
t−1(1 + i
g
t−1). (5)
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Analogous to the case of savers discussed in equation (4), at the beginning of the period, before
type changes have played out, the combined debt of Home households who are borrowers is
given by
Ab−t = B
p
t−1(1 + i
b
t−1). (6)
where Bpt−1 denotes nominal private debt and i
b
t−1 denotes the Home borrowing rate. The
beginning-of-period wealth of Foreign households is defined analogously. It bears noting that
savers in Home and Foreign receive the same rate of interest idt on their deposits. As further
specified below, we assume that this rate is the central bank’s policy rate. By contrast, the
rates of interest that borrowers are charged in the two countries may diverge.
Denote by A†t the beginning-of-period wealth of the pool of individuals who were selected to
redraw their characteristics. Before they are randomly assigned a new type, the wealth of
households in this pool is (in per capita terms):
A†t = θ
[
Spt−1(1 + i
d
t−1) +B
g
t−1(1 + i
g
t−1)−B
p
t−1(1 + i
b
t−1)
]
+(1− θ)
[
Sp∗t−1(1 + i
d
t−1) +B
g∗
t−1(1 + i
g∗
t−1)−B
p∗
t−1(1 + i
b∗
t−1)
]
= θBgt−1(1 + i
g
t−1) + (1− θ)B
g∗
t−1(1 + i
g∗
t−1).
The first line provides the value of wealth contributed by Home households (selected to redraw
their type). This is the amount of domestic assets net of domestic liabilities. The second line
presents the same values for those who have previously resided in Foreign. The third line
consolidates these items, anticipating the behavior of intermediaries as described by equation
(18) further below.
The combined wealth of Home saver households at the end of the period, i.e., after type
changes have taken place, is given by:
Spt +B
g
t = δ
[
Spt−1(1 + i
d
t−1) +B
g
t−1(1 + i
g
t−1)
]
− pisX
s
t + pis(1− δ)A
†
t . (7)
Here Xst denotes expenditures of a saver household net of its nonfinancial income:
Xst = Ptc
s
t − wtPth
s
t −D
f
H,t −D
int
t + T
g
t .
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Above, wt is the (Home) economy-wide real wage; D
f
H,t are profits earned by goods-producing
firms (again in per capita terms of the Home population). The ownership of these firms is
assumed to remain domestic. Dintt are profits arising at the financial intermediaries. The
intermediaries are assumed to be owned by Home and Foreign households in proportion to
their respective population size. Last, T gt are lump-sum taxes levied by the Home government.
The combined end-of-period debt of Home borrower households (per capita of the Home
population) is given by
Bpt = δB
p
t−1(1 + i
b
t−1) + pibX
b
t − pib(1− δ)A
†
t , (8)
Net expenditures for the borrower, Xbt , are defined analogously to those for the saver. The
Foreign terms are defined in the same way as those for Home households.
Turning to the intertemporal consumption decisions, note that, as a result of the family and
pooling assumptions, all households of a specific type have a common marginal utility of real
income, λτt , and choose the same level of expenditure. For Home households, we have, for
example,
λst =
∂ us(c
s
t , h
s
t )
∂cst
, (9)
λbt =
∂ ub(c
b
t , h
b
t)
∂cbt
. (10)
Similar relationships apply to Foreign households.
In Home, the optimal choices regarding borrowing from and lending to intermediaries, as well
as to the government, are governed by the following Euler equations:
λst = βEt
1 + idtΠt+1
δλst+1 + (1− δ)
[
θ[pibλ
b
t+1 + pisλ
s
t+1] + (1− θ)[pibλ
b∗
t+1 + pisλ
s∗
t+1]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=λ¯t+1

 ,
λst = βEt
[
(1− ϑt+1)(1 + i
g
t )
Πt+1
{
δλst+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
}]
, (11)
λbt = βEt
[
1 + ibt
Πt+1
{
δλbt+1 + (1− δ)λ¯t+1
}]
. (12)
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The consumption Euler equations have the same structure for the Foreign households. Note,
in particular, that the assumptions on partial risk sharing imply that for borrowers and savers,
and Home and Foreign households, the continuation values share a common element (λt+1).
In Home, optimal labor supply by each type of household, in turn, is given by
hst =
(
λst
ψs
wt
)1/ν
, (13)
hbt =
(
λbt
ψb
wt
)1/ν
, (14)
and again the same for Foreign households. Recall that, by assumption, households supply
labor only in the country where they reside. Across household types, average labor supply,
ht = pi
bhbt + (1− pi
b)hst , is given by
ht =
(
Λt
ψ
wt
)1/ν
, (15)
where
Λt := ψ
pib(λbt
ψb
)1/ν
+ pis
(
λst
ψs
)1/νν (16)
and ψ−1/ν = pib(ψb)−1/ν + pis(ψs)−1/ν . Finally, for future reference we define
λt = pi
bλbt + (1− pi
b)λst (17)
as the average marginal utility of real income across types in the Home country.
3.2 Financial intermediaries
Savers and borrowers have access to area-wide perfectly competitive intermediaries. The
intermediaries accept risk-free deposits, paying the interest rate idt . This is the same interest
rate that the intermediaries would need to pay in order to refinance themselves at the central
bank. Borrowing conditions, instead, depend on the jurisdiction in which the borrower resides.
As in CW, we assume that in each period a fraction of loans χt and χ
∗
t cannot be recovered in
Home and Foreign, respectively (due to, say, fraud). Intermediaries are assumed to collect the
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largest quantity of deposits that can be repaid with the proceeds of the loans they originate,
that is,
(1 + idt )(θS
p
t + (1− θ)S
p∗
t ) = (1 + i
b
t)θB
p
t + (1 + i
b∗
t )(1 − θ)B
p
t
∗
. (18)
Using ωt as the spread between lending and deposit rates in Home, we have
1 + ωt :=
1 + ibt
1 + idt
. (19)
Choosing the amount of lending, Bpt and B
p∗
t , to maximize profits, the first-order conditions
for loan origination yield
ωt = χt and ω
∗
t = χ
∗
t . (20)
In departing from CW, but following our own earlier work, Corsetti et al. (2013), we assume
that χt and χ
∗
t depend on sovereign risk in each country. This assumption is meant to capture
the adverse effect of looming sovereign default risk on private-sector financial intermediation.
Conceptually related is the notion that in the case of a sovereign default, the government di-
verts funds from the payments made by borrowers; see Mendoza and Yue (2012). Specifically,
we assume that in Home
χt = χψ[(1 + i
g
t )/(1 + i
d
t )]
αψ − 1, (21)
where parameter χψ > 0 is used to scale the private spread in the steady state, and αψ ≥ 0
measures the strength of the spillover from the (log) sovereign risk premium to the (log)
private risk premium. In Foreign we have
χ∗t = χ
∗
ψ[(1 + i
g∗
t )/(1 + i
d
t )]
α∗ψ − 1. (22)
The spreads in Home and Foreign may thus differ. We allow for two distinct reasons: Either
the yields on sovereign bonds in Home and Foreign differ, or the parameters that govern the
spread (χψ, αψ and χ
∗
ψ, α
∗
ψ) differ. Finally, while the intermediaries in equilibrium do not
make profits, we have to take into account the transfers from intermediaries to households
implied by loans that are not recovered by the intermediaries. Therefore, in accounting for
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the value of the intermediary to the households, Dintt = ωtθB
p
t + ω
∗
t (1− θ)B
p∗
t .
3.3 Firms
In each of the two countries, there is a continuum of firms. Home firms are indexed by
j ∈ [0, θ), Foreign firms by j ∈ [θ, 1). Each of these produces a differentiated good using
linear technology
yH,t(j) = zht(j), (23)
where z is the aggregate productivity level. In each period only a fraction (1 − α) of firms
are able to reoptimize their prices. Firms that do not reoptimize adjust their price by the
steady-state rate of inflation, Π. Prices are set in period t to maximize expected discounted
future profits. The resulting first-order condition for a generic firm that adjusts its price,
P optH,t , is given implicitly by
Ft = Kt (24)
with
Kt = λt
µ
µ− 1
wt
yt
z
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)−µ
+ αβEt
(
P optH,tΠ
P optH,t+1
)−µ
Kt+1, (25)
Ft = λtyt
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)1−µ(
PH,t
Pt
)
+ αβEt
(
P optH,tΠ
P optH,t+1
)1−µ
Ft+1. (26)
The law of motion for prices of the Home-produced basket (ΠH,t := PH,t/PH,t−1) is given by
1− α
(
Π
ΠH,t
)1−µ
= (1− α)
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)1−µ
. (27)
For future reference, it is also useful to define price dispersion of Home goods as ∆H,t :=
1
θ
∫ θ
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−µ
dj, which evolves according to
∆H,t = α∆H,t−1
(
ΠH,t
Π
)µ
+ (1− α)
(
P optH,t
PH,t
)−µ
. (28)
Analogous expressions apply to the corresponding Foreign terms. Finally, nominal prof-
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its distributed to households by these firms are (in per capita terms) given by DfH,t =
1
θ
[∫ θ
0 PH,t(j)yH,t(j) − Ptwtht(j)dj
]
; or, in equilibrium, DfH,t = PH,t yH,t − Ptwtht. Here
yH,t =
[
(1/θ)
∫ θ
0 yH,t (j)
µ−1
µ dj
] µ
µ−1
denotes the per capita production of the bundle of dif-
ferentiated goods produced in the Home country.
3.4 Government
In each country, the government finances a stream of exhaustive government spending, gt,
through lump-sum taxes or by issuing debt. Spending is isomorphic to private consumption
and hence falls on both Home and Foreign goods. Per capita Home government debt evolves
according to:
Bgt = (1− ϑt)B
g
t−1(1 + i
g
t−1) + Ptgt + T
c
t − T
g
t .
In the sections further below, we will consider different assumptions regarding the law of
motion for government spending, gt.
Taking into account (5), the government flow budget constraint is given by
Bgt = B
g
t−1(1 + i
g
t−1) + Ptgt − T
g
t . (29)
Regarding taxes, we assume that
T gt
Pt
− tg = φT,y(yH,t − yH) + φT,bg(b
g
t−1 − b
g), φT,y > 0, φT,bg > 0. (30)
Here and in the following, variables without a time subscript refer to steady-state values.
bt := Bt/Pt denotes the real value of debt, t
g the real tax revenue in steady state. Tax revenue
rises when economic activity improves, with parameter φT,y denoting the semi-elasticity of
revenue with respect to output. Similarly, it rises whenever debt exceeds its target value.
Throughout the paper, we assume that φT,bg is large enough so as to eventually stabilize
public debt.
While actual default ex post is neutral in the sense described above, the ex ante probability of
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default is crucial for the pricing of government debt (igt ) and for real activity.
14 In the current
paper, as in our previous work, Corsetti et al. (2013), we operationalize sovereign default
by appealing to the notion of a fiscal limit in a manner similar to Bi (2012). Whenever
the debt level rises above the fiscal limit, default will occur. The fiscal limit is determined
stochastically, capturing the uncertainty that surrounds the political process in the context
of sovereign default. Specifically, we assume that in each period the limit will be drawn from
a generalized beta distribution with parameters αbg , βbg , and b
g,max
. As a result, the ex ante
probability of default, pt, at a certain level of sovereign indebtedness, b
g
t , will be given by the
cumulative distribution function of the beta distribution as follows:
pt = Fbeta
(
bgt
4yH
1
b
g,max ;αbg , βbg
)
. (31)
Note that b
g,max
denotes the upper end of the support for the debt-to-GDP ratio. Regarding
the haircut this implies
ϑt =
 ϑdef with probability pt,0 with probability 1− pt. (32)
Turning to monetary policy, we assume throughout that the central bank follows a Taylor-type
interest rate rule for the aggregate economy that also seeks to insulate aggregate economic
activity from fluctuations in risk spreads. In particular, we assume:
log(1 + idt ) = log(1 + i
d) + φΠ [θ log(Πt/Π) + (1− θ) log(Π
∗
t /Π)]
−φω [θ log((1 + ωt)/(1 + ω)) + (1− θ) log((1 + ω
∗
t )/(1 + ω))] .
(33)
Here, φΠ > 1, φω > 0. We will assume below that the central bank, if possible, will set φω so
as to neutralize the effect that the spreads ωt and ω
∗
t have on aggregate activity.
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14This implication of our setup is in line with evidence reported by Yeyati and Panizza (2011). Investigating
output growth across a large number of episodes of sovereign default, they find that the output costs of default
materialize in the run-up to defaults rather than at the time when the default actually takes place.
15For the closed economy, Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009) show that optimal policy in the presence of credit
frictions involves some adjustment of policy rates in response to interest rate spreads.
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3.5 Market clearing
Goods-market clearing at the level of intermediate goods requires that
yH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−µ{(PH,t
Pt
)−1
[θ(ct + gt) + (1− θ)(c
∗
t + g
∗
t )]
}
, (34)
where per capita consumption in Home and Foreign is given by ct = pibc
b
t + pisc
s
t and c
∗
t =
pibc
b∗
t + pisc
s∗
t , respectively.
The supply of Home and Foreign output, in respective per capita terms, is given by
yH,t∆H,t = zht. (35)
and
yF,t∆F,t = zh
∗
t . (36)
4 A tractable special case of the model
In this section, we derive a linear approximation of the model’s equilibrium conditions for a
tractable special case that yields intuitive analytical expressions.16 These expressions will be
useful in setting up and interpreting our numerical experiments, conducted for a more general
version of the model in Section 5 below.
As regards notation, in what follows a variable without a time subscript refers to the steady-
state value. A tilde indicates deviation from the steady state. Hence, g˜t := gt − g, and y˜t :=
yt−y. The variables that carry hats are defined as Π̂t := log(Πt/Π), ω̂t := log((1+ωt)/(1+ω)),
and îdt := log((1+i
d
t )/(1+i
d)). A bar over a variable indicates area-wide averages; for example,
y˜t := θy˜t + (1− θ)y˜
∗
t .
16We closely follow Corsetti et al. (2013), extending our previous results for a closed economy to the case of
two countries in a currency union.
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4.1 Assumptions
The tractable special case of our model is based on the following six additional assumptions.
Assumption 1: The parameters are restricted such that only the current period’s average
interest rate spread enters the area-wide IS equation directly.17
The area-wide IS equation then links output to real government spending and to the effective
real interest rate through
y˜t − g˜t = Ety˜t+1 − Etg˜t+1 − σ¯
[̂
idt + (pib + sΩ) ω̂t − EtΠ̂t+1
]
. (37)
Here σ¯ = pib
cb
y σb + pis
cs
y σs is the average intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and sΩ is
defined in Footnote 17. Since pib + sΩ > 0, fluctuations in the private-sector spread can
influence area-wide economic activity if they are not neutralized by monetary policy.
Assumption 2: The parameters are such that the credit spread does not enter the area-wide
Phillips curve, which is thus given by:
Π̂t = βEtΠ̂t+1 + κy y˜t − κgg˜t, (38)
where κy := κ(ν + σ¯
−1) and κg := κσ¯
−1, with κ := (1−α)(1−αβ)α .
18
Assumption 3: We assume that φω = (pib + sΩ). Under this assumption, up to a first-order
approximation, the central bank in normal times fully neutralizes the effect of the private
credit spread on aggregate economic activity; see equations (33) and (37). Whenever this is
the case, fluctuations in the sovereign risk premium do not affect aggregate economic activity
either.
Assumption 4: We assume that producers in Home and Foreign face the same marginal
costs.19 Under this assumption, the terms of trade will remain constant, which ensures that
the solution remains tractable even if the two countries are asymmetric or show asymmetric
fiscal responses.
17More formally, we assume that sΩ(δ¯ − 1) = ψΩ. Here, sΩ := pibpis[
cb
y
σb −
cs
y
σs]/σ¯, ψΩ := pib(1 − χb) −
pis(1− χs), with χτ = β
Rτ
Π
{δ + (1− δ)piτ}. Last, δ¯ := χb + χs − 1.
18More formally, we assume that [sΩ + pib − γb] = 0 where γb ≡ pib
hb
h
.
19Labor subsidies/labor taxes can be introduced so as to achieve this.
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Assumption 5: The credit risk premium depends on the expected government deficit, rather
than the expected level of government debt, according to the following relationship (pib +
sΩ)ω̂t = ξEt(g˜t+1 − φT,yy˜t+1), and (pib + sΩ)ω̂
∗
t = ξ
∗Et(g˜
∗
t+1 − φT,yy˜
∗
t+1). As specified in the
previous section, parameter φT,y ∈ [0, 1) measures the sensitivity of tax revenue with respect
to economic activity. But here, in the tractable special case of our model, the parameter
ξ ≥ 0 indicates the extent to which a weak fiscal position—as measured by primary deficits—
adversely affects private-sector spreads. Other things equal, high values of the parameter ξ
can be associated with an economy that has a high level of public debt and a correspondingly
high responsiveness of the sovereign risk premium to a change in the fiscal outlook.20 Below,
we allow for different slopes of the spread in the two countries, so that parameter ξ need not
equal ξ∗.
Under the assumptions above, the average spread that enters the area-wide IS equation (37)
can be expressed as
(pib + sΩ)ω̂t = ξ
(
g˜t+1 − φT,yy˜t+1
)
+ θ(1− θ)ξDg˜Dt+1, (39)
where ξ = θξ+(1− θ)ξ∗, ξD = ξ− ξ∗, and g˜Dt := g˜t− g˜
∗
t . The average spread depends on the
area-wide levels for output and government spending, and on the difference across countries
in the level of government spending.21 Note that the average slope matters for the average
risk premium (see the first term on the right-hand side of the equation above). Moreover, to
the extent that the slopes differ (ξD 6= 0), there may be scope for different policies in Home
and Foreign (see second term).
Assumption 6: The policy rate, îdt , is fixed in the initial period, but, following Christiano et al.
(2011) and Woodford (2011) monetary policy reverts to the Taylor rule îdt = φΠΠ̂t − φωω̂t in
the next period with probability 1−µ, where µ ∈ (0, 1). Otherwise, the interest rate remains
constant. The same Markov structure applies to all subsequent periods. As a result, the
expected length of the constant-interest-rate episode is given by 1/(1 − µ).
20Section 3.2 in Corsetti et al. (2013) explicitly shows how ξ relates to the debt level.
21There are no differences in per capita output in the two regions, by virtue of Assumption 4.
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4.2 Equilibrium determinacy
We are now ready to examine the determinacy properties of the model for different fiscal
policy configurations. The first proposition establishes parameter restrictions that yield a
(locally) determinate equilibrium when government spending is determined exogenously in
both countries.
Proposition 1 In the economy summarized by equations (37) – (39), where monetary policy
is conducted according to assumption 6 above, let government spending in both countries be
exogenously given. There is a locally unique bounded equilibrium if and only if
a) a < 1/(βµ), and b) (1− βµ)(1− a) > µσ¯κy,
where a := µ+ µξ¯φT,yσ¯.
Proof. See Appendix C.1 of Corsetti et al. (2013).
Exactly as in our previous work for the closed economy, we find that the presence of a sovereign
risk channel may undermine equilibrium determinacy in a monetary union. Specifically, con-
ditions a) and b) are more likely to be violated if the average interest rate spread is sufficiently
responsive to the government deficit (meaning ξ¯, and thus a, is large enough).
Different from the closed-economy model, however, what matters for determinacy is the av-
erage slope of the risk premium in the union. Accordingly, a high sovereign risk premium
affecting a sufficiently large part of the union can have systemically destabilizing effects, even
if the rest of the union does not face elevated risk premia. At the same time, the fact that
the risk premium is convex in sovereign debt suggests that pooling of government liabilities
across borders may move the aggregate economy from an indeterminate to a determinate
equilibrium. The main question is the extent to which, by reducing ξ¯, debt pooling can fill
in for the missing monetary response (that is, the fact that the central bank is cannot adjust
the interest rate) during the initial period(s).
A second, related issue of interest is the extent to which, with or without pooling, determinacy
can be fostered by a systematic government spending policy—which we abstracted from in
Proposition 1. To address this question, we next allow the governments in Home and Foreign
to adjust spending systematically in response to output movements.
In the first of our exercises, the policy response to output movements is symmetric across
Home and Foreign. This exercise illustrates a potential benefit of austerity, namely, that
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procyclical spending cuts at the level of the union may contain the risk of indeterminacy (by
increasing the region of parameters for which the equilibrium is determinate). Let area-wide
government spending be given by g˜t = ϕy˜t, and let each of the two countries conduct the
same spending policy.22
Under this assumption, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the economy specified in Proposition 1, let government spending in Home
and Foreign take on the same value g˜t = g˜
∗
t = ϕy˜t when the interest rate is held constant,
and g˜t = g˜
∗
t = 0 otherwise. Suppose further that ϕ < 1. Define a
∗ := µ + µξ¯φ∗T,yσ¯
∗;
φ∗T,y := φT,y − ϕ; σ¯
∗ = σ¯/(1 − ϕ); and κ∗y = κy − ϕκg. There exists a locally unique bounded
equilibrium if and only if:
1. with a∗ ≥ 0
a) a∗ < 1/(βµ), and b) (1− βµ)(1 − a∗) > µσ¯∗κ∗y,
2. with a∗ < 0,
a) (1 + βµ)(1 + a∗) > −µσ¯∗κ∗y, and (1− βµ)(1− a
∗) > µσ¯∗κ∗y.
Proof. See Appendix C.2 of Corsetti et al. (2013).
The most relevant implications are rather intuitive (compare Corollary 4 in Corsetti et al.
(2013), which also applies here). Without the sovereign risk channel (ξ¯ = 0), the range
of (nonpolicy) parameters for which the equilibrium is determinate is larger if area-wide
government spending is countercyclical (ϕ < 0). With an endogenous risk premium, instead,
the opposite may hold. Specifically, suppose that ξ¯ > 0, the conditions of Item 1 of Proposition
2 hold, and taxes are not too elastic with respect to output (φT,y < 1− κν/(1− βµ)ξ¯). Then
the range of fundamental parameters for which the equilibrium is determinate is at least as
large with a procyclical spending response, ϕ ∈ (0, 1), as without any response, and can be
strictly larger.
The main message is that, under certain circumstances, systematic spending cuts can help to
anchor expectations to a unique equilibrium at a time when the central bank cannot adjust
22Note that the fiscal response function specified in our model is more general than might appear at first
glance. Suppose, for example, that government spending would, instead, react to the primary deficit according
to g˜t = γ(g˜t − φT,yy˜t). Under this rule, the higher γ, the more government spending would be expected to
rise with the deficit. Now, for γ < 1, and ϕ < φT,y , there is a one-to-one mapping between the two rules’
parameters, implying that a more countercyclical spending policy formulated in terms of output (a more
negative ϕ) also maps into a more countercyclical policy in terms of the deficit (a higher γ), and vice versa.
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interest rates. Those circumstances are more likely to prevail when either the elasticity of tax
revenue to economic activity (φT,y) is large, or the sensitivity of the interest rate spread to
prospective deficits (ξ¯) is high.
To see why, assume that, for given policy rates, agents develop arbitrary expectations of a
drop in output. Lower output would mean less tax revenue and, in the absence of a fiscal
response, higher deficits. In high-debt economies these deficits would imply a significantly
higher interest rate spread. Since a widening of the interest rate spread is not (or cannot be)
offset by monetary policy, the real interest rate would rise. A sharp rise in the real rate will
weigh sufficiently on private demand to make nonfundamental expectations of adverse output
developments self-fulfilling. In such a situation, a procyclical fiscal stance (insofar as it offsets
the budgetary impact of the anticipated fall in tax revenue due to lower output) may prevent
adverse expectational shocks from translating into a contraction in real economic activity.
The following proposition synthesizes the result from a different exercise in which we allow
government spending to react to output asymmetrically across countries. In particular, we
assume that when one region pursues a countercyclical spending policy, the policy in the
other region is procyclical. In order to illustrate as clearly as possible how asymmetric fiscal
responses in Home and Foreign affect area-wide determinacy, we keep area-wide government
spending constant in this exercise (g˜t = 0).
Proposition 3 In the economy specified in Proposition 1, let government spending in Home
and Foreign take on values of g˜t = ∆ϕy˜t and g˜
∗
t = −
θ
1−θ∆ϕy˜
∗
t when the interest rate is held
constant, and g˜t = g˜
∗
t = 0 otherwise. Define a
∗∗ := µ + σ¯µ(ξ¯φT,y − θξ
D∆ϕ). There exists a
locally bounded equilibrium if and only if:
1. with a∗∗ ≥ 0:
a) a∗∗ < 1/(βµ), and b) (1− βµ)(1− a∗∗) > µσ¯κy,
2. with a∗∗ < 0:
a) (1− βµ)(1− a∗∗) > µσ¯κy, b) (1 + βµ)(1 + a
∗∗) > −µσ¯κy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The central implication of our proposition is summarized by Corollary 6 in the appendix.
Suppose that the spread is more responsive to the deficit in Home than in Foreign, so that
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ξD := ξ − ξ∗ > 0. Then, without changing the area-wide level of government spending,
determinacy is more likely to be assured if fiscal austerity in Home (the higher-spread region)
is combined with fiscal expansion in Foreign (the lower-spread region).
4.3 The fiscal multiplier
Having discussed how the sovereign risk channel influences equilibrium determinacy, it is
worth touching on the implications for the fiscal multiplier, that is, the effects of exogenous
variation in government spending on economic activity. In this section, as in Woodford
(2011) and Christiano et al. (2011), we assume that parameters are such that the equilibrium
is determinate, and we let government spending deviate from its steady-state level as long
as policy rates remain constant. We establish that sovereign risk and its distribution across
countries matter greatly for the size and the sign of the fiscal multiplier.
In our model, government spending affects economic activity through three different channels.
First, it adds directly to aggregate demand, which, in the presence of nominal rigidities,
drives economic activity. Second, as economic activity expands, marginal costs and inflation
increase. At the ZLB (or with constant nominal rates), real interest rates decline and private
expenditure rises (see Woodford 2011 and Christiano et al. 2011), implying a large fiscal
multiplier. However, fiscal policy also has real effects through the sovereign risk channel:
higher government spending may raise the deficit and thereby increase interest rate spreads,
which, all else equal, depresses private expenditure. For the closed economy, this channel can
partly or even fully offset the large fiscal multiplier at constant interest if sovereign risk is
high; see Corsetti et al. (2013).
To the extent that the exogenous fiscal impulse is union-wide and symmetric, our simplified
two-country setup is isomorphic to a closed economy, and the same result applies here: the
multiplier may go toward zero and even turn negative if sovereign risk is very high at the
union level (a high ξ¯) and the expected duration of the constant-interest rate episode is not
too short.
Next, we establish new results concerning the effects of asymmetric fiscal impulses. Specifi-
cally, we consider a scenario in which one country expands government spending by as much
as the other country cuts it, so that the area-wide spending level is unaffected.
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Proposition 4 Under the conditions spelled out by Proposition 1 (which ensure that a locally
unique bounded equilibrium exists), let Home government spending take on a value of g˜t = gL
while Foreign government spending takes on a value of g˜∗L = −
θ
1−θgL as long as the interest
rate is constant. Both Home and Foreign spending are equal to 0 otherwise. As before, define
a := µ+ µξ¯φT,yσ¯. Then, while the interest rate is fixed, output is given by
y˜L = −
σ¯µθξD
1− a−
σ¯µκy
1−βµ
gL.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Let ξD > 0, that is, the spread is more responsive to the deficit in Home than it is in
Foreign. In this case, a Home spending expansion and a simultaneous Foreign contraction
have a negative effect on economic activity in the currency area. This effect comes about
because (i) average government spending remains unchanged, so that there is no direct effect
on aggregate demand in Home and Foreign; (ii) at the same time, however, the budgetary
spending measure affects consumption more in the region with a more elastic risk premium
(that is, Home, where a spending expansion raises deficits and thereby risk premia).
This result provides a warning against a scenario in which, perhaps under the presumption
that austerity is self-defeating, high-debt countries adopt expansionary fiscal policies to which
low-debt countries react with an offsetting budget contraction. Even abstracting from its
potential consequences on determinacy (see Proposition 3 above), the overall impact of this
policy mix would likely be undesirable. Indeed, aggregate activity would increase in the exact
opposite scenario, where spending cuts occur in the country with the more elastic risk premium
(Home), while the other country expands. In this case, again keeping area-wide government
spending constant, a reduction in the average spread causes an expansion of activity in both
regions. Our analysis thus suggests that coordinated fiscal packages, designed to internalize
the asymmetric elasticity of risk premia to economic conditions, can be expansionary without
necessarily altering the area-wide spending level.
Finally, we consider the case of a country-specific fiscal impulse. In particular, we assume
that g˜t = gL and g˜
∗
t = 0 during the constant-interest episode. As a result g˜t = θgL. The
following proposition states our result.
Proposition 5 Under the conditions spelled out by Proposition 1 (which ensure that a locally
unique bounded equilibrium exists), let Home government spending take on a value of g˜t = gL
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as long as the interest rate is constant, and 0 otherwise, while g˜∗t = 0 throughout. Then,
during the period of constant interest rates, output is given by
y˜L =
1− µ−
σ¯µκg
1−βµ − µσ¯ξ
1− µ− µξ¯φT,yσ¯ −
σ¯µκy
1−βµ
θgL.
Proof. A simple extension of the proof of Proposition 4.
This result illustrates that the effect of a unilateral fiscal impulse depends on both country-
specific and area-wide sovereign risk. To see this, note that the average spread enters the
above expression in such a way that (as long as φT,y > 0, and determinacy is ensured) the
denominator is strictly falling in ξ¯. All else equal, the larger the average spread, the larger
the effect of spending variation on area-wide economic activity, because higher tax revenues
reduce interest rate spreads. At the same time, for a given fiscal expansion, the effect on
area-wide activity declines with the extent of sovereign risk in the country that engineers the
fiscal expansion (ξ in the numerator).
5 Model simulations
We now drop the simplifying assumptions of the previous section and turn to simulations
of the full model outlined in Section 3. We aim to provide a quantitative analysis of key
aspects of the euro area debt crisis, under alternative assumptions as regards spending and
risk-pooling policies. Our results are based on a linear approximation of the equilibrium
conditions of this model.
5.1 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the euro area. In the following, Home refers to the stressed
economies, Foreign to the rest of the euro area. In terms of structural parameters we assume
that both regions are isomorphic, except for fiscal policies and size: Home accounts for θ = 1/3
of the currency union, corresponding to the GDP weight of the stressed economies within the
euro area. A time period in the model is one quarter. All nonfiscal parameters in our
baseline parameterization are set assuming a ratio of government debt to (annual) GDP of 60
percent across both parts of the euro area, in line with the reference value in the Maastricht
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Table 3: Parameters
α 0.925 χψ 1.006 φT,y 0.500 ϑdef 0.550
αbg 3.702 δ 0.950 pib 0.500 θ 0.333
βbg 0.539 µp 1.150 ψb 1.829 ξb 0.296
b
g,max
2.559 ν 0.526 ψs 0.760 ξs 0.104
αψ 0.550 φΠ 1.500 σs 1.307 Π 1.005
β 0.991 φω 0.500 σb 0.693 z 3.000
Notes: Parameters of the baseline calibration.
Treaty. When considering a higher initial stock of debt, we appropriately adjust steady-
state tax revenue, the response of taxes to the debt level, φT,bg , and the level of government
spending. The latter is set at 20 percent of each country’s GDP. Table 3 lists the resulting
parameterization.
As regards the parameters that govern the link between (strained) public finances and (ele-
vated) private-sector spreads, we draw on global cross-country evidence. Actual haircuts in
the case of a sovereign default show large variation; see Panizza et al. (2009) and Moody’s
Investors Service (2011). A 50-60 percent haircut appears to be a reasonable average value;
so ϑdef = 0.55. With respect to the specification of the fiscal limit, we set the parameters
to αbg = 3.70, βbg = 0.54, and b
g,max
= 2.56. This parameterization follows Corsetti et al.
(2013), who in turn choose these values to match the relationship between the sovereign risk
premium, as measured by 5-year CDS spreads, and public debt in a sample of industrialized
economies. As regards the spillovers from sovereign spreads to spreads in private credit mar-
kets that are at the heart of the sovereign risk channel, we follow the estimates in Harjes
(2011) and set αψ = 0.55.
With respect to monetary policy, we assume an average inflation rate of 2 percent per year.
The coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule, which the central bank follows during normal
times, is set to a customary value of φΠ = 1.5. However, the economy does not start in
normal times: in our baseline scenario, we assume that the interest rate is fixed in the initial
period. In the following period, mimicking the Markov structure in Assumption 6 of Section
4.1, it reverts to the rate prescribed by the Taylor rule with probability µ. In the baseline, we
set µ such that the policy rate is expected to be kept constant for 9 quarters. This value is
consistent with data on Eonia OIS rates as of July 2012 (see Figure 3 above). With regard to
the response of the interest rate to the private spread, we set φω = 0.5. The price stickiness
parameter is fixed at α = 0.925. Judging by microeconomic evidence on price rigidities,
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the implied frequency of price adjustment may appear too low. However, our calibration
implies an appropriately flat Phillips curve, causing inflation to respond relatively little to a
recessionary shock, in line with the actual behavior of inflation during the latest crisis.
Regarding the other targets, we set productivity such that the steady-state output per capita
in both parts of the euro area equals unity. We set the response of taxes to output to
φT,y = 0.5. This appears to be reasonable for the relatively progressive tax systems of
the euro area; see Girouard and Andre´ (2005). We assume that for each debt level, taxes
react sufficiently strongly (φT,bg large enough), so that debt remains bounded throughout.
Through that assumption we explicitly aim to rule out equilibria that follow the logic of the
fiscal theory of the price level. Finally, for the spread between deposit and lending rates, we
target a steady-state value for ω and ω∗ of 2.5 percent (annualized). This corresponds to the
average difference from 1999–2007 (thus pre-crisis) between the rate on new loans (for tenors
of 1 to 5 years, up to EUR 1 million) and the Eonia rate. The steady-state level for the
central bank’s target interest rate, id, is set to be 4.5 percent (annualized).
We set the share of borrowers in the economy equal to pib = 0.5, as in Corsetti et al. (2013).
We target a ratio of private debt to annual GDP, b/4y, of 130 percent, in line with average
values (1999–2007) for debt in the nonfinancial private sector (loans, debt securities, and
pension fund reserves). Households redraw their type on average every 20 quarters, meaning
δ = 0.95. With regard to the preference parameters, we set the curvature of the disutility of
work to ν = 1/1.9, in line with the arguments provided by Hall (2009). We target a gross
price markup of µp = 1.15, which is in the range of values typically used in the literature.
We also target a steady-state value for aggregate hours worked of h = 1/3. As in Corsetti
et al. (2013), we assume that the consumption-weighted average intertemporal elasticity of
substitution takes a value of σ¯ := pibσbcb+ pisσscs = 0.8. We choose the relative values of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the two types of households (σb and σs) and of the
scaling parameters for the disutility of work (ψb and ψs) such that (i) the above targets are
satisfied; and (ii) for want of a better target, the steady-state consumption of the two types
of households is the same.
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5.2 Macroeconomic stability in the euro area
The question that motivates our analysis is whether, under the conditions prevailing in mid-
2012, a sovereign crisis in the stressed economies of the euro area could expose the entire
monetary union to the risk of a belief-driven downturn. According to the evidence discussed
in Section 2, prior to any de facto pooling of sovereign risk through ESM and OMT, sovereign
liabilities in the two regions amounted to 93 and 126 percent of GDP, respectively. Assuming
full utilization of the scope provided by ESM and OMT, debt levels could effectively become
equalized across regions. To gauge the impact of this hypothetical outcome, we consider a
scenario where both regions have the same debt stock of some 104 percent of GDP.
Based on the results in Section 4, the consequences of sovereign risk on equilibrium determi-
nacy cannot be evaluated independently of the future conduct of monetary and fiscal policy,
which is subject to considerable uncertainty. In what follows, we therefore consider alternative
assumptions. Regarding monetary policy, we report results for two different time horizons
over which the central bank is expected to keep interest rates unchanged, i.e., 9 and 10 quar-
ters. A duration of 9 quarters corresponds to our baseline case, but the financial market data
in Figure 3 show that an even more extended ZLB period cannot be ruled out. Regarding
fiscal policy, we vary assumptions about the fiscal stance in the two regions.
5.2.1 Fiscal and monetary interaction
We set the stage for our analysis by considering a pre-pooling policy scenario in which gov-
ernment spending exhibits a common stance across both parts of the euro area. This case is
shown in the top row of Figure 4, for which debt in the rest of the euro area is held constant
at 93 percent of GDP. The left and right panels show results for an expected ZLB episode of
9 and 10 quarters, respectively. In each panel, the horizontal axis measures the liabilities of
the stressed economies over a wide range, including the 2012 value of 126 percent of GDP. On
the vertical axis, a positive (negative) value indicates a common procyclical (countercyclical)
fiscal stance.23 Formally, we capture the cyclical stance of spending through the parameter
ϕ, such that g˜t = ϕy˜t and g˜
∗
t = ϕy˜
∗
t . For the resulting parameter combinations we check
whether the equilibrium is uniquely determined; the grey area represents the parameter space
23The evidence discussed in Section 2 suggests that, in the wake of the global financial crisis, both parts
of the euro area pursued a procyclical stance, by implementing fiscal austerity in a downturn. A procyclical
stance corresponds to ϕ > 0.
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for which it is.
A first result of our analysis concerns the role of monetary and fiscal interaction. In the first
row of the figure, absent any region-specific, endogenous spending response to output (hence
along the horizontal line at ϕ = 0), the equilibrium is determinate if the expected duration
of the constant-interest-rate episode is 9 quarters, but indeterminate in the 10-quarter case.
To assess the role of the sovereign risk channel in generating equilibrium indeterminacy for a
given monetary policy, we counterfactually set debt equal to the Maastricht level of 60 percent
of GDP in either country. In this case (not shown in the figure), the equilibrium would be
determinate over a constant-interest-rate horizon up to 10 quarters. Loosely speaking, without
systematic cyclical variation in spending, sovereign risk under our calibration of the model
moves the frontier of indeterminacy problems forward by one quarter.24
In the graphs in the top row of Figure 4, the area above the zero line corresponds to a
common procyclical spending stance, implying systematic cuts in a recession at the union
level. Thus, a second result of our analysis is that a strongly procyclical spending stance
gives rise to equilibrium indeterminacy, quite independently of the level of liabilities in the
stressed economies. In our baseline with a constant-interest-rate period of 9 quarters, and
debt in the stressed economies as high as 126 percent of GDP, the equilibrium would not be
determinate for a value of ϕ in excess of 0.4. Note that in the simple model of the previous
section, this threshold would still imply a cyclical deterioration of the primary surplus in a
recession. The reason is that for ϕ = 0.4 tax revenue is even more responsive to output than
government spending.
While the recent developments in the euro area motivate the assumption of a similar fiscal
stance across both parts of the euro area, it is instructive to consider alternative scenarios.
Next, we therefore allow for the cyclical behavior of spending to differ systematically across
regions. The panels in the middle row of Figure 4 refer to the case in which government
spending is constant and hence acyclical in the rest of the euro area, whereas it comoves
positively or negatively with economic activity in the stressed economies. Consequently, the
area above the zero line now accounts for procyclical spending in the stressed economies only.
The equilibrium is uniquely determined, independently of the fiscal stance in the stressed
24This result arguably understates the consequences of the sovereign risk channel, since we do not allow the
horizon over which interest rates are constant to depend on fiscal conditions. In Corsetti et al. (2013), we
model an endogenous exit from the ZLB. For that case, we find that sovereign risk tends to delay the exit from
the ZLB, possibly by several quarters.
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Figure 4: Determinacy and endogenous spending policies
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Notes: Determinacy regions for the case of an endogenous response of government spending to
economic activity during a constant-interest-rate period. Grey areas mark parameterizations that
imply determinacy. In the left panel, interest rates are expected to remain constant for 9 quar-
ters, in the right panel for 10 quarters. x-axis: government debt level in the stressed economies
(percent of their GDP). Debt in the rest of the euro area is assumed to be 92.5 percent of GDP.
A vertical dashed line marks a debt level in the stressed economies of 126 percent of GDP. Top
row: common fiscal stance ϕ (g˜t = ϕy˜t, g˜
∗
t = ϕy˜
∗
t ). Middle row: government spending in the
rest of the euro area constant, y-axis: response of stressed economies’ government spending to
output in stressed economies ϕ (g˜t = ϕy˜t). Bottom arrow: y-axis measures differential response of
government spending to output, ∆ϕ (g˜t = ∆ϕy˜t, g˜
∗
t = −
θ
1−θ
∆ϕy˜
∗
t ).39
economies, so long as their debt is below 130 percent of GDP. For debt levels above this
threshold value, however, macroeconomic instability arises if the stressed economies pursue
countercyclical spending expansions. Intuitively, high debt elevates the role for the sovereign
risk channel. With a high sensitivity of risk premia to changes in government debt, expan-
sionary spending plans in reaction to an economic slowdown exacerbate the vulnerability of
the region to self-fulfilling expectations of a downturn.
Furthermore, macroeconomic instability looms large when the constant-interest-rate episode
is expected to last longer. The middle-right panel refers to a 10-quarter horizon. At the
2012 debt level for the stressed economies, only a policy of very procyclical austerity in this
region (with spending falling at least one for one with output) appears to be able to rule
out self-fulfilling crisis dynamics (not shown in the panel). Hence, determinacy only prevails
under extreme requirements on spending policy.
To save space, we omit the figure showing our results for the reverse exercise, which allows
for cyclical spending policies in the rest of the euro area while keeping spending constant in
the stressed economies. The picture is indeed similar to the upper panels of Figure 4. This
finding resonates with our theoretical analysis in Section 4: provided that debt is not too
high, the negative demand effects of procyclical spending cuts dominate the beneficial effect
on interest rates. Conversely, a countercyclical stance in the rest of the euro area contributes
to stability in the stressed economies by generating positive demand spillovers.
As a final step, we consider the case of asymmetries in the fiscal stance. In line with Propo-
sition 3, we assess combinations of countercyclical and procyclical policies in the two parts of
the euro area, such that aggregate spending remains constant at the union level. The results
are shown in the lower panels of Figure 4. In these panels, the vertical axis measures the
differential in the fiscal stance: positive values represent a procyclical stance in the stressed
economies and a countercyclical stance in the rest of the euro area.
Overall, we find that the shape of the determinacy region is similar to the scenario with
unilateral adjustment in government spending in the stressed economies (middle panels). That
said, the size of the determinacy region shrinks somewhat in the bottom panels (which assume
constant aggregate spending). Intuitively, the scope for policy mistakes increases: if one region
pursues a policy that undermines stability, the other region—under our assumption—further
exacerbates this.
40
At high debt levels in the stressed economies, the combination of policies most likely to bring
about a determinate equilibrium is a procyclical stance in the stressed economies coupled
with a countercyclial stance elsewhere. To see why, suppose that markets come to believe,
for nonfundamental reasons, that the stressed economies will experience a drop in economic
activity. As discussed above, high sovereign risk means that such beliefs may easily become
self-fulfilling. All else equal, spending cuts in the stressed economies reduce the deficit and
thereby ease both sovereign risk and private-sector spreads. At the same time, the counter-
cyclical stance in the rest of the euro area offsets the direct effect of spending cuts in the
stressed economies on area-wide aggregate demand. All else equal, this stimulates economic
activity and tax revenue in the stressed economies and thus contributes to averting a self-
fulfilling crisis. In fact, under our assumption of constant aggregate spending, the asymmetric
fiscal stance in the rest of the euro area completely neutralizes the direct demand effects of
spending cuts in the stressed economies, leaving the sovereign risk channel as the only relevant
transmission mechanism.
5.2.2 Risk pooling
Insofar as sovereign risk premia increase nonlinearly in the level of debt, a pooling of liabilities
(all else equal) induces a fall in the risk premium in the stressed economies that is only partially
offset by higher risk premia in the rest of the euro area. In principle, as shown in Section 4,
pooling can thus ensure determinacy by weakening the sovereign risk channel.
We now carry out our analysis assuming a common debt level at 104 percent of GDP, as would
be implied by a complete equalization of debt levels in our illustrative pooling scenario. Under
our calibration, this common debt level implies a reduction of the sovereign risk premium in
the stressed economies by some 300 basis points relative to the pre-pooling scenario discussed
above.25
Figure 5 shows the results pertaining to the case of a common debt-to-GDP ratio and a
common fiscal stance in both parts of the euro area. As in the previous figure, the two panels
are drawn conditional on either a 9- or 10-quarter anticipated duration of the constant-
interest-rate episode. In each panel, the common debt level is measured along the horizontal
axis. The common fiscal stance, accounting for the way spending is systematically adjusted to
25A reduction of about 300 basis points was, in fact, observed during the late summer of 2012, following the
ECB’s first hints at a new bond purchase program; see Figure 1 above.
41
Figure 5: Determinacy regions (grey) – post-pooling
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Notes: Determinacy regions for the case of an endogenous, symmetric response of government spending
to economic activity during a constant-interest-rate period. Grey areas mark parameterizations that imply
determinacy. y-axis: symmetric response of government spending to output, ϕ (¯˜gt = g˜t = g˜
∗
t = ϕ¯˜yt). x-axis:
government debt level (symmetric). A vertical dashed line marks a post-pooling debt-GDP level of 104.0
percent. In the left panel, interest rates are expected to remain constant for 9 quarters, in the right panel for
10 quarters.
output, is measured along the vertical axis. Once again, the grey area indicates combinations
of parameters for which the equilibrium is determinate; the white area refers to indeterminacy.
Not surprisingly, the implications of risk pooling for equilibrium determinacy are sensitive to
the overall level of debt. When pooling results in a common debt-to-GDP ratio that is rela-
tively low, determinacy is ensured if the spending policy at the union level is countercyclical
or at most mildly procyclical. Intuitively, at moderate debt levels, the positive multiplier
effect of government spending on aggregate demand dominates the effect of the sovereign risk
channel. At high levels of debt, the opposite is true. In fact, determinacy at high levels of
debt requires a strongly procyclical stance. In our calibration, the reversal occurs somewhere
just below a debt-to-GDP ratio of 120 percent with 9 quarters of constant interest rates, and
at 100 percent of GDP for the longer duration of 10 quarters.
Note that in our baseline scenario with a constant interest rate for 9 quarters, pooling of
debt at 104 percent of GDP does not make the cyclical stance of spending any less relevant
for macroeconomic stability compared to the pre-pooling scenario. Indeed, determinacy in
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the pooling scenario is assured only if fiscal policymakers in the union as a whole run a
countercyclical or at best mildly procyclical spending policy. This finding suggests that a
transfer of government liabilities across member states, in and by itself, would do little to
address equilibrium indeterminacy under the conditions considered here.
6 Conclusion
Rising risk premia on government debt tend to drive up credit spreads in the private sector.
When the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on policy rates, these
spillovers from public to private spreads give rise to a sovereign risk channel that alters
the trade-off between fiscal consolidation and support for economic activity. We integrate
this sovereign risk channel in an otherwise standard New Keynesian two-country model and
explore its implications for macroeconomic stability in a monetary union.
We calibrate the model to key features of the euro area as of mid-2012, distinguishing govern-
ment debt levels across stressed and other economies. We show formally how the sovereign
crisis in the stressed economies may threaten macroeconomic stability in the euro area as
a whole, by exacerbating the risk of self-fulfilling expectations of a deflationary downturn.
This result rests on the assumption that i) monetary policy is constrained for an extended
period; and ii) both subgroups of euro area economies pursue procyclical policies during a
recession—a policy scenario that strikes us as empirically relevant. By contrast, we also find
that a (coordinated) asymmetric fiscal stance that combines procyclical cuts in the stressed
(high-debt) economies with countercyclical expansion in the other (lower-debt) countries is
conducive to macroeconomic stability.
Building on this analysis, we consider the potential pooling of sovereign risk, as implied by re-
cent institutional initiatives within the euro area, notably the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM) and the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Since risk premia increase
nonlinearly in debt, risk pooling reduces the strength of the sovereign risk channel. Even so,
our simulations suggest that pooling per se does not alleviate the threat to macroeconomic
stability arising from beliefs-driven fluctuations as long as the union-wide fiscal stance re-
mains largely procyclical. Thus, the most critical aspect of policy coordination turns out to
be the interaction between (constrained) monetary policy at the level of the currency union
and the cyclicality of fiscal policy in the constituent parts.
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In our model, debt pooling generates a fall in spreads, in line with the actual stabilization
of financial market conditions in the euro area since the introduction of ESM and OMT.
Our analysis cautions against viewing this fall in spreads as evidence that debt pooling alone
contributes much to making the euro area robust to beliefs-driven fluctuations. We wish
to emphasize, however, that there are other interpretations of the ECB’s OMT framework,
which work through a change in monetary policymakers’ behavior on or off the equilibrium
path instead of through debt pooling. These different dimensions may have contributed
significantly to macroeconomic stabilization; see the recent contributions by Aguiar et al.
(2012) and Corsetti and Dedola (2013) on the role of a monetary backstop to rule out multiple
equilibria.
The transmission mechanism we analyze in this paper emphasizes the adverse effects on
current output of expectations of a possible sovereign default in the future. For the sake of
tractability, we model the sovereign risk channel using empirically motivated reduced-form
relationships between the fiscal outlook and risk premia on public and private debt. As a way
forward, a model accounting for endogenous default under imperfect policy credibility might
improve our understanding of how these relationships are shaped by actual policy trade-offs
between distortions caused by taxes and inflation, output stabilization, and (endogenous)
default costs. Such an extension of our model could contribute a monetary perspective to
recent research (see, for instance, Mendoza and Yue 2012) that examines the endogenous
output effects of sovereign debt crises in fully-fledged models of fiscal policymaking.
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A Proofs of propositions
This appendix collects the proofs to the propositions in the main text. The appendix also
presents the corollaries and their proofs.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3
The economy, stripped of exogenous variables, is given by
Etzt+1 = Azt,
where zt = [y˜t; Π̂t]. In this case
A =
1
a∗∗µβ
[
βµ+ σ˜µκy −σ˜µ
−a∗∗κy a
∗∗
]
,
where a∗∗ is defined in the proposition.26 The Blanchard-Kahn conditions for determinacy
require that matrix A have two roots outside the unit circle. Woodford (2003), pp. 670f.,
gives the following necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy:
either (Case I): (i) det(A) > 1, (ii) det(A) − tr(A) > −1, and (iii) det(A) + tr(A) > −1,
or (Case II): (i) det(A)− tr(A) < −1 and (ii) det(A) + tr(A) < −1.
1. If a∗∗ > 0, det(A) > 0, so only Case I can be satisfied. Conditions (i) and (ii) of that
case correspond to conditions a) and b) in Proposition 3. Since tr(A) > 0, condition
(iii) of Case I is also satisfied.
2. For a∗∗ < 0, det(A) < 0, so Case I cannot hold. The conditions given in the proposition
are those pertaining to Case II with a∗∗ < 0. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The assumed Markov structure means that output and inflation (in deviations from the steady
state) will take on the same respective values, y˜L, and ΠˆL in every period in which monetary
policy is constrained, and values of zero thereafter.
The Phillips curve gives
ΠˆL =
κy
1− βµ
y˜L.
Use this, and the terms for the spread in the IS equation:[
1− a−
σ¯µκy
1− βµ
]
y˜L = −σ¯µξ
Dθ gL.
The term in square brackets is strictly positive per condition b) for determinacy in Proposition
1. Solving for yL yields the expression given in the proposition. 
26Here we assume that a∗∗ 6= 0. Establishing the conditions for determinacy for a∗∗ = 0 is straightforward.
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B Statement and proof of Corollary 6
Corollary 6 Under the conditions of Proposition 3, suppose that ξD := ξ − ξ∗ > 0, so that
the Home spread is more responsive to the Home deficit than the Foreign spread is to the
Foreign deficit. Then, the range of fundamental parameters (that is, parameters other than
∆ϕ) for which the equilibrium is determinate is at least as large with a suitable choice of
∆ϕ > 0 (that is, procyclical spending policy in Home and countercyclical spending policy in
Foreign) as in the absence of an endogenous spending response, and can be strictly larger.
Proof. Absent a fiscal response, a∗∗ > 0, which makes item 1 of Proposition 3 the relevant
point of departure. ∂a
∗∗
∂∆ϕ
< 0. A positive value of ∆ϕ, chosen such that a
∗∗ will remain
positive, means that condition (i) holds for a bigger set of fundamental parameters than with
∆ϕ = 0. The same is true for condition (ii).
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